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Introduction 
At the meetings of the 2017 National People’s Congress (NPC) andChinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), the Bei-jing government reiterated the “Internet Plus” action plan (“Hulian-
wang+” xingdong jihua 互联网+”行动计划). According to Chinese Premier
Li Keqiang, “Internet Plus” entails the integration of mobile Internet, big
data, cloud computing, and the Internet of Things (wu lianwang 物联网)
with manufacturing. The aim of this policy is to promote innovation-driven
development, foster new industries, cultivate entrepreneurial individuals,
and upgrade China from a “big industrial country” to a “creative country.” 
As China’s economic growth slows after two decades of rapid expansion,
Beijing is concertedly seeking strategies to bolster the economy. Information
and Communication Technologies (ICT) fits this bill. Through a clarion call
to combine Internet technology with modern manufacturing, the Chinese
Government is trying to foster a broad “Creative Society” (chuangxin xing
shehui 创新性社会) and realise its “Chinese Dream” (Zhongguo meng 中国
梦). With the government’s relentless support for the IT industry over the
past three decades, China is currently at the acme of its tech boom. The
world has witnessed the breakneck emergence of an “IT dragon” that is
largely supported by a huge cheap labour force and a massive churning out
of copycat products. As China connects itself closer to the global digital rev-
olution, the global open source movement and maker movement have also
had a great impact on its IT prosperity. Transnational IT companies, hack-
erspaces, and open source communities are cross-pollinating with China,
making the IT vista even more diverse.
By the end of 2014, China’s ICT market output reached US$204 billion
(see Figure 1), accounting for 1.9% of China’s GDP. Software has become a
fast-growing sector as China establishes itself as one of the most important
countries for ICT production and consumption. In 2013, software production
in China accounted for 25% of the total ICT industry and 13.4% of the
global software market. Based on Gartner’s report, (1) China has been the
world’s second largest software producer since 2013.
The convergence of technology production, political discourse, and general
public entrepreneurship enables new areas of research. Previous literature
has addressed China’s ICT development on the macro level (e.g., Segal 2003;
Zhao 2007), while a mesi- or micro-lens on individual and contextualised
IT practices has received less attention. To fill this gap, this paper examines
China’s ICTs by particularly focusing on individual programmers’ work prac-
tices. Programmers, especially those from small companies in China, are
also referred to as “manong,” which literally translates as “code farmers” in
English. In Chinese, ma (码) means code, while nong (农) refers to traditional
Chinese farmers who have limited education, who are frequently dispos-
sessed of power, and are frequently overlooked. When combined, the word
“manong” depicts a position related to programming and coding that is also
subject to frequent exploitation and high pressure. 
Through the lens of an ethnographic study in Shenzhen, Guangdong
Province, this article explores digital experience of Chinese manong in IT
companies. While it addresses IT practices in a more detailed way, the paper
does not overlook the inseparable relations among individual programmers,
social institutions, and technology. By introducing stories and discourses
from the fieldwork in Shenzhen IT companies, this article illustrates the
mixed role technology plays in programmers’ technological experience as
well as in remaking their subjectivity. The paper argues that technology
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ABSTRACT: Built on the theoretical framework of articulation and assemblage, this article explores programming practices among grassroots
programmers in contemporary China. Using data obtained from ethnographic fieldwork in Shenzhen, Guangdong Province, it provides an ac-
count of the information technology practices in contemporary China at the nexus of the Beijing government, IT corporations, and individual
programmers. Through examining how programming is articulated in both China’s advocacy for “a creative society” and grassroots program-
mers’ daily practices in the process of China’s informatization, this article has mapped myriad articulations such as engagement, communica-
tion, discourse, and practice that have made and unmade grassroots programmers’ programming assemblage. We argue that technology for
Chinese programmers is a mixed blessing. As a means of survival, technology exacerbates the precariousness and marginalisation of grass-
roots programmers in China, while the capability of technology production also enables the remaking of subjectivity and social change. The
findings of this study thus advocate a deeper and dialectical understanding of the interaction between technology, labour, and empowerment.
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itself cannot be fully understood without considering its essential sociopo-
litical and socioeconomic character. 
Why are technicians such as programmers important? From a historical
perspective, the narratives of technology tend to regard its development
through isolated physical artefacts or visible things, while little attention is
paid to the people behind it. This compelling discourse may risk becoming
technological determinism as it ignores the interactions among people, in-
stitutions, and society. Secondly, previous literature on technology attaches
importance to technology use while less consideration is paid to technology
production (Ensmenger 2012; Light 1999). Taking China as an example, while
IT professionals such as programmers constitute a critical part of its “digital
empire,” little attention has been paid to technological practices such as
how technology is deployed and constructed in specific contexts. In other
words, how the invisible but no less significant programs, codes, and algo-
risms are embedded into technological narrations is of importance in un-
derstanding techno-social relations. 
The article is structured as follows. First, a theoretical framework of artic-
ulation and assemblage is introduced, which presents the programming
practices in an interconnected and contextualised way. Second, the methods
of data collection and data analysis are explained. In this part, experience
is addressed as an effective way to illustrate the social meaning of techno-
logical practice among grassroots programmers in China. In the data anal-
ysis, the universal scramble for IT jobs in Shenzhen is described, illustrating
how technology is understood and serves as a means of survival for grass-
roots programming labour. Following this, an alternative analytical lens is
proposed by discussing how Chinese and English are used differently in pro-
grammers’ coding work. The focus then shifts to examine how programmers
gain empowerment through teamwork, algorithms, and the fledging maker
movement. The possibility for remaking programmers’ subjectivity and so-
cial change is discussed in the conclusion.
Theorizing IT practices: Programming as
articulation and assemblage
This article employs the theory of articulation and assemblage as an ex-
ploration of the technological practices of Chinese programmers. In the the-
ory of “double articulations,” Deleuze and Guattari (1988) maintain that
one form of articulation can be
“the plane of expression,” which
refers to signifying semiotics or
discursive practices, including but
not limited to elements such as
categories, discourses, forms, and
identities. According to Deleuze,
assemblage is “a multiplicity
which is made up of heteroge-
neous terms and which estab-
lishes liaisons, relations between
them, across ages, sexes and re-
gions—different natures”
(Deleuze and Parnet 2002, p. 69).
It can therefore be argued that
assemblage refers to the network
of articulations that link forma-
tions among heterogeneous ele-
ments. The elements of assemblage may include “discourses, words,
‘meanings,’ and non-corporeal relations that link signifier with effects” (Sti-
vale 2014, p. 94). Assemblages can be systems of signs, things, actions, or
semiotics. Delanda argues (2010), however, that the relation between ar-
ticulations and assemblage is not simply whole and parts, unity and ele-
ments. Rather, the two levels of scale (articulations and assemblage) can
be both constraining and enabling to each other. The relationship can be
manifested in a top-down direction, in which individual entities can only
remain active and functional within a social assemblage. Alternatively, it
can also be a bottom-up relationship, with individual entitles at different
levels (persons, communities, organizations) interacting with each other
and thus forming forces to be reckoned with by assemblages. 
This paper will examine the interactive relations between articulations
and assemblages in individual programmers’ work experience in contem-
porary China. As a theoretical framework, articulations and assemblage have
been persuasive in explaining techno-social relations (e.g. Wallis 2015). The
articulations and assemblage framework captures technology not as static
or unified infrastructures, but as an ongoing system that is composed of,
and interacting with, “social practices, discursive statements, ideological po-
sitions, social forces or social groups” (Slack 1996, p. 331). In the politics of
technology in China, both individuals and society are transformed by the
informatization agenda. In order to build a theoretical connection between
individual entities at different levels and the overall ever-changing IT indus-
try, I argue that China’s informatization assemblage is shaped and re-shaped
by the interconnected physical, ideological, and subjective activities in the
IT industry. To be specific, the assemblage in China is the programming prac-
tices constructed by Chinese programmers, which can be divided into two
main aspects. The first is how programmers get involved in the process of
China’s informatization. The second is the role of programmers in the in-
ternational division of digital labour (Fuchs 2014). Articulations are also di-
vided into two parts: expressional and practical. I argue that programmers
use both discursive and collective experiences to build their social identities
and work performance. 
The rationale of the articulation and assemblage framework presumes
that any articulation or assemblage is historically and contextually contin-
gent. Assemblage creates territories, not in a static way, but always in mak-
ing or unmaking. It is noted that articulations are made, maintained, or
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transformed in particular social practices, while assemblages are connected
or disconnected, embedded or dis-embedded in social cultures or relations.
As will be demonstrated in this paper, programming can be reviewed as an
ongoing set of articulations and linked assemblages. Programming assem-
blages are not just collections of physical hardware, gadgets, or algorithms,
but also take up particular languages, discourses, communication, and social
meanings in programmers’ lived practices. Programming assemblage refers
not only to the networks or linkages among different elements in program-
mers’ daily practices, but also to the asymmetric power relations Chinese
ICTs have generated between individuals, institutions, and technology. View-
ing programming as articulation and assemblage, this article aims not to
complicate its theoretical abstraction, but to employ it as an utilizable, yet
also malleable and changeable framework in exploring the technological
experience of Chinese programmers. In other words, using articulation and
assemblage does not place the emphasis on the predetermined narratives
on technology, but rather embraces “conceptual openness to unexpected
possibilities and resolutions” (Ong 2006, p. 17) in which experience, dis-
courses, and communications are expressed and negotiated in a specific
context.
In tackling articulation and assemblage in programming, this paper par-
ticularly focuses on the experience of programmers in Shenzhen. Based on
previous literature, experience can be defined as the engagements people
have made to relate themselves to the world, which includes feelings,
thoughts, expressions, and actions (Scott 1992; Bruner 1986; Pickering
1997). This study uses what Burner terms “the anthropologist of experience”
as the entry point to Shenzhen’s fieldwork (Burner 1986, p. 9). Rather than
just including snippets of discourses and narrations of the participants, the
anthropologist of experience regards participants as active agents and takes
their expressions such as memoirs, narratives, and other forms of discourse
as experience. By doing this, “we leave the definition of the unit of investi-
gation up to the people, rather than by the anthropologist as alien observer”
(Burner 1986, p. 9). In this research, the programming experience includes
a wide range of social activities and discourses such as code development,
interactive communication, discursive expressions, and organisational prac-
tices. 
To collect data, I conducted ethnographic fieldwork in Shenzhen from July
2015 to July 2016. By working as a Search Engine Optimizer (SEO) in an IT
company called AoC, I conducted participant observations with program-
mers. (2) After building trustful relationships with programmers in AoC, I then
conducted interviews with a total of 45 programmers through snowball
sampling. Participants came from more than 20 small companies. I con-
ducted interviews with each of the interviewees one or two times, with
each interview lasting 60 to 90 minutes. The interviews were conducted in
Chinese, and I translated them into English later. The interviews usually
started with the researcher telling the interviewees the purpose of the study
and promising confidentiality. Informed consent was agreed or endorsed by
interlocutors. The researcher usually started with warm-up questions such
as “describe your work experience” or “describe the project you are doing
now.” Then questions such as, “why do you want to be a programmer?,” “do
you think of yourself as a manong (code farmers), or “what are the impres-
sive things in your work experience?” were asked. Sometimes the author
also made the dialogue open so as to find interesting and unexpected data. 
Rather than focusing on the upper-class programmers who work in big IT
companies such as Tencent, Alibaba, or Huawei, the fieldwork paid particular
attention to “grassroots programmers” working in small companies in Shen-
zhen’s Nanshan District. According to Yue (2015), small companies (with a
total number of staff less than 50) dominate the Chinese IT market. They
account for more than 55% of the total number of software corporations,
accommodating 90% of the programming labourers in China. As distinct
from high-level programmers in giant companies, “grassroots programmers”
are the “new poor” (Wang 2014) as urbanisation and informationalization,
which are characterised by deficient education, lower income, and precar-
ious work conditions, continue in China. Graduating from vocational schools,
programmers usually cluster in small outsourcing start-ups and maintain
unstable work, since small IT companies may go bankrupt at any time. 
In Shenzhen, programmers have been part of the “invisible human infras-
tructure” (Oregalia 2013, p. 24) that keeps the city running. As discussed
previously, with China’s continuing globalisation, individual programmers’
work has not only been integrated into the national movement to build a
“creative society,” but also contributes to the global labour market. Based
in this context, the paper answers the following two questions: How does
the assemblage of programming, from either a national or global perspec-
tive, interact with the articulations performed by individual programmers
in China? What does the work practice of Chinese programmers add to ex-
isting knowledge about articulations and assemblage? 
Program or be programmed 
Over the last four decades, the open door policy and Beijing’s relentless
pursuit of modernity have paved the way for the emergence of China’s in-
formatization. As a country whose modern history has been characterised
by backward technology and an ignorance of science, China’s efforts to
transform its national image have been evident in political rhetoric praising
the realisation of informatization and the building of an IT empire. From
2004 to 2014, the ICT market output has increased six-fold, and IT devel-
opers tenfold. As the IT industry has roared to life in big cities, a substantial
number of migrant workers have been uprooted from traditional manufac-
turing and have immersed themselves in this new field. Instead of following
their migrant parents into the factories, the second generation of migrants
regards IT as a more effective way to make a living. Roberto is the first pro-
grammer I encountered in my fieldwork. After failing the College Entrance
Exam (gaokao 高考) three times, he attended Aptech Beida Qingniao (Beida
qingniao 北大青鸟), a popular IT training school in China, and became a
Java programmer in Shenzhen. Regarding his reason for becoming a pro-
grammer, he said:
My fellow villager [laoxiang 老乡] told me that I could find a high-
salary job in big cities if I learned computer programming there
[Aptech Beida Qingniao, the IT training school]. Beida Qingniao also
guaranteed me a job if I could complete the training courses. (3)
The large demand of the IT industry requires churning out as many pro-
grammers as possible. As a consequence, training organisations have blos-
somed. At the company where I conducted my internship and gathered
fieldwork data, there were LED advertisement boards of IT training schools
on the metro ad walls (see Figure 2). These advertisements change every
week, reminding passers-by of an “easier and better” way to hunt for a job.
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Training organisations such as Aptech Beida Qingniao, Tsinghua Wanbo
(qinghua wanbo 清华万博), and ITcast (chuanzhi boke 传志博客) are quite
familiar to people in big cities. They provide various IT training courses to
attract more trainees, but the tuition fee is usually not cheap. At Aptech
Beida Qingniao in Shenzhen, staff asked for 15,888 yuan (approx. US$2,450)
for a three-month course in zero-based Python (one of the programming
languages). 
The schedules of these IT crash courses are tight. For example, XDL
(xiongdilian 兄弟连) in Shenzhen is a training organisation that arranges 14
hours’ IT training per day for people who come from 8:00 A.M. to 12:00 P.M.
Trainees are required to make 24-hour commitment to their courses. Stu-
dents are accommodated in shabby dormitories near the training organi-
sation, with eight or more sharing one room. Based on different computing
languages, they are divided into dozens of classes, with 20 to 80 trainees
as a unit. Their main activities during the training were attending class and
practicing coding. “Too many things in one day—you can hardly digest
them without practicing by yourself,” Roberto said. Most of the trainees in
these training organizations are youth from rural areas who either dropped
out of school or failed the college entrance exams. Under the pressure of
high tuition fees and job-hunting, no one skips class. Trainees nevertheless
also complain about their training. For instance, in order to drum up busi-
ness, some training schools guarantee trainees work after finishing their
course, but that quite often turns out to be bogus. Meanwhile, when trainees
are sent to the labour market, they often find that their education in the
training schools is not enough to obtain a programming job. Wu Qing is a
programmer who received his training at XDL, but three months after he
finished training, he was still looking for a job. 
For many rural migrants in China, choosing to become a programmer is ar-
ticulated as a way to “survive” rather than “thrive.” Many factors contribute
to the seemingly speculative choice to engage in software programming.
Compared with people who work in other fields, programmers in the IT in-
dustry have relatively high salaries that few would consider giving up. The
burden of supporting families also plays an important role in pushing them
to remain programmers. Working as programmers, they are often seen as
“important providers” to support their siblings or families. Jane is a .NET (a
kind of programming language) developer from Yiyang, Hunan (益 阳 ， 湖 南 ). 
Every month, she sends half of her salary (2,500 yuan, approx. US$380) home
to pay her younger brother’s tuition fees. In China, it is not uncommon for
elder working sisters to send money back to support their families, who usu-
ally live in the rural areas and are mired in poverty and insufficiency. In the
summer of 2015, Roberto left Shenzhen and entered another start-up in Bei-
jing. The reason for doing that, according to him, was for “more money” and
to “support his bros.” During our third interview, Roberto shared his stories
with me. He had to pay a housing loan for his elder brother, who was serving
a jail sentence. In addition to the housing loan, he also had to support his
parents, both of whom are farmers from a small village in Henan Province.
He told me:
I am not interested in the work I will do in Beijing. (…) But the thing
is I can earn more money in this small company. In Shenzhen, I get
12,000 [yuan, approx. US$1,860], but here I can get 16,000 [yuan,
approx. US$2,480], though they are doing some online education
systems that are very boring to me. (4)
In explaining the relationship between articulations and assemblage, De-
landa (2010) suggests that articulations at a personal level are usually con-
strained by the overall assemblage. The underground programming training
movement ongoing in Shenzhen is more passive than active. More specifi-
cally, these would-be programmers are pushed by the top-down tide of in-
formatization and urbanisation in China. Loaded with the burden of
supporting rural families, their choices in job seeking become limited, and
programming becomes one of very few opportunities left for rural youth to
gain social mobility. Takhteyev (2012) mentioned the nerd characteristics
of software programmers in Rio de Janeiro, and stressed their childhood
passion for computers. It would be wholly inaccurate to assume that China
lacks people who are obsessed with programming, but for grassroots pro-
grammers in China, their lack of passion and fascination with coding makes
programming far from their first choice of professions. In other words, these
“coding farmers” (Sun and Magasic 2016) in China do not choose to do
software programming; rather, they are chosen for it.
The mother tongue or the better tongue?
Ethnographic fieldwork in Shenzhen gave me more exposure to program-
ming languages. Like most people who do not work with programming, I
am completely unfamiliar with these arcane and highly technical codes. It
was not until the winter of 2014, when I communicated more frequently
with some of my interviewees, that I realised I had to immerse myself in
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Photo 1 – Advertisement Boards for IT Training in the
Taoyuan Metro. © Ping Sun, May 2016.
programming language if I wanted to know more about its meaning to the
programmers. I started to actively look at the programs my interlocutors
wrote, trying to figure out their basic meaning, while also beginning the
journey of learning Python, a widely used programming language. I soon
discovered an interesting phenomenon when I tried to discuss source code
with programmers: most of the codes they wrote were a mix of Chinese
and English—or to be more precise, a mix of Chinese and a particular pro-
gramming language, the latter usually composed of English words (see
Photo 2). 
As I found during my fieldwork, programmers’ discussions and discourses
about programming language quite often express inherent contradictions
in their daily work practices. In examining the source code, it is common to
find an amalgamation of two languages: Chinese and English. The snippet
shown on Photo 2 has two types of text: the text enclosed in “/*…*/” (the
first six lines) and the two line starting with “//.” Such texts are comments,
which are usually ignored by Java syntax, and in fact they can be written in
any language. The second type of text is the Java program, which converts
the readable comments into coded instructions that can be recognised by
the computer. It can be surmised that programmers maintain a very limited
choice of languages for the second type of text, since the very technology,
Java complier, can only be understood and processed in English. The Chinese
characters that appear in the Java program are messages for the call end
(zhendui diaoyong duandi tishi xinxi 针对调用端的提示信息), to help them
better know what the codes mean, since this software is for Chinese clients.
Of course, the Chinese version can be replaced by any other language, such
as Hindi, Spanish, German, or Russian. When I asked Roberto why he used
Chinese for comments, he replied: 
Roberto: “It is just more natural and convenient for us to use Chinese.
Of course, I mean, it is our mother tongue, right? We use Chinese to
remind us what we are doing in this part of the code, or we will forget
the content.”
Researcher: “The code content? You can’t just read the code?”
Roberto: “Well, we can, but it is time-consuming for me to read En-
glish all the time, you know. I am not good at English.” (5)
Programmers mostly use Chinese for the comments, and then they have
to follow the instructions of Java to finish the main body of the program
with English. In an analysis of software language, Takhteyev (2012) discusses
the relationship between English as a global language and Portuguese as a
local language, indicating that English is not only associated with the culture
of software but is also embedded in its very technology (Takhteyev 2012).
Programs are machine-built codes, which can only be recognised by a cer-
tain type of language. Here, English being the “normal language” has been
widely accepted as a precondition for programmers in China. As the original
language of the entire Java programming system, English is irreplaceable
and indispensable. For programmers in China, their overall programming
skills are confined and performed within English, and coding in Chinese is
usually thought of as something impossible or ridiculous. 
The articulated conflict between Chinese and English is far from a coinci-
dence. To some extent, it sheds light on the power relations between Chi-
nese as a peripheral language and English as a central language in
programming. For programmers in China, being good at or at least making
themselves familiar with English is the first step, as all the codes they are
typing are in English. Sometimes this can be a challenge for the lower level
manong, since their English training in the vocational schools is lacking.
Matthew came to Shenzhen hunting for a job after he graduated from a
vocational school in Anhui Province. He greatly valued the ability to use En-
glish well. Matthew told me that his English used to be very poor, but in
order to continue in his work, he memorised all of the frequently used pro-
gramming patterns and practiced them by inserting them into his coding.
During the interview, many other programmers also expressed their admi-
ration for programmers who were good at English and described them as
“high-level” (gaoduan 高端). Brown was one of the “high-level” program-
mers. When I asked him what kind of website he used for programming in-
formation searching, he said:
I usually go to Google or Github to search source code whenever I
come across a problem. So, in that case, English can really help you
a lot. As long as you can understand it, you will find it is a big, big
world, a lot of good codes out there… It’s huge. (6)
During the interview, Brown laughed at programmers who searched codes
on Baidu and said the Chinese websites were his last choice: “English is better.
It shows you’re professional.” In his discourse, English is not only a tool for
programming, but also a kind of cultural capital that can take them to a higher
level of social status. Every time I asked my interlocutors about teaching my-
self Python, they all recommended I go for the original English book rather
than the translated Chinese one. Roberto told me:
Your English is good; go for the English version. It is direct and orig-
inal. This is your big advantage. (7)
The presence of “English admiration” in the software industry is not limited
to the programming language, but also extends into a wider corporate en-
vironment. In the IT companies in Shenzhen, it is not uncommon for soft-
ware programmers to give themselves English names. Some companies even
N o . 2 0 1 7 / 4  •  c h i n a  p e r s p e c t i v e s 23
5. Roberto, Shenzhen, August 2015.
6. The interview was conducted in November 2015 in Nanshan District, Shenzhen. Brown used to
work in Shanghai, and he moved to Shenzhen in the winter of 2015. 
7. Roberto, Shenzhen, August 2015.
Ping Sun – Programming Practices of Chinese Code Farmers
Photo 2 – A Snippet of Java Source Code. 
© Ping Sun, November 2016.
make this a policy. In the daily work routine, they keep calling each other
English names, and claim that “everyone is equal this way” (meigeren dou
shi pingdeng de 每个人都是平等的). 
Linguists use “diglossia” to describe a context wherein a particular social
group uses two different languages simultaneously, and in which most of
the group members are fluent (Ferguson 1959; Grosjean 1982). These two
languages have different functions in the system. Manong programmers in
China are far from a typical diglossic system, since many of them are not
proficient in English. In the interaction between Chinese and English, how-
ever, the different roles these two languages have played in the identity
construction of programmers are clearly evident: English is the “high” lan-
guage that is used for formal communication or professional programming,
while Chinese is much more of a peripheral or “low” language that is used
for daily communication and informal chatting. 
Programming language has its own hegemony. In the discussion of as-
semblage and articulation, Delanda (2010, p. 13) notes that there is a ten-
dency wherein assemblage “homogenizes its own components.” By making
English the standard coding language, programming in the perspective of
the international division of labour territorialises its boundaries, and sharp-
ens the distinction between English and Chinese. The use of English is ar-
ticulated as being synonymous with professionalism, egalitarianism, and
even social status. As the IT industry becomes more globally connected,
mastering English has become a must for programmers. Here the language,
or more specifically English, acts as another social structure, which controls
how the codes and programs are created and processed. As a consequence,
the diglossic system becomes not just a pragmatic choice, but also a stan-
dard for drawing a line between professional and non-professional, bureau-
cratic and egalitarian, educated and non-educated, or even high social
status and low social status. 
It is also worth considering the power relations underlying English as a
better tongue and Chinese as the mother tongue. As a latecomer to the dig-
ital economy, China, and Chinese programmers, struggle within a technical
assemblage that has been well established by Western countries. Being dis-
enfranchised by rule designing and process designing, Chinese programmers
are located at the bottom of the labour division pyramid, and become even
more passive during the process of programming. Here we are not to ignore
or disparage the natural competitive advantage of English being a program-
ming language, but move further to think why English can become a factor
in explicating software programmers’ articulations in China. Here articula-
tions on programming languages not only reflect the hardship and difficulty
for China, but also the struggle for the Global South to establish its own
coding system in the global programming system.
Articulations of making the alternative
On 25 May 2015, China’s largest online travel agency (OTA) Ctrip was
hacked: its search engine service was not accessible, and users could not
access its page links. According to a report in The Wall Street Journal, the
Nasdaq-listed company was hacked by “unidentified sources,” leading to a
loss of more than US$15 million. This incident stunned the general public.
This case provides new perspectives to rethink the power of algorithms as
well as the “techies” who master them. When the assemblage of program-
ming attempts to homogenise its component articulations, it may confront
counter-forces from the articulations, which contain the potential for pro-
ducing an alternative. Although individual programmers from small com-
panies are confined within a technologically structured framework, this does
not mean they are necessarily subject to biased power relations. Rather,
fieldwork data indicate that grassroots programmers may construct their
identification with technology inside and outside of their work. This dual
narrative presents the possibility of individual empowerment within an even
wider collaborative solidarity.
Salary bargaining is a case in point. Empowered by their programming
skill, programmers’ requests for salary increases are considered more seri-
ously. Evan is a front-end programmer for data visualisation in the company
where I completed the internship. He shared with me regarding his success
in negotiating a higher salary over the last two years at AoC: 
The first time I asked for a salary rise was half a year after I came to
AoC. (…) I finished the first project well, which was rather satisfying.
(…) I talked with our boss, and he agreed to my request. My salary
increased from 4,500 (yuan, approx. US$700) to 6,000 (yuan, approx.
US$930). (8) (…) The company recruited another guy, Simon. I had to
teach Simon everything; meanwhile, I also had to finish my work. I
asked for a salary rise again. The tightwad (a nickname for the boss
that company staff used in private conversation) refused. I didn’t give
up. (…) When I told him I was considering leaving the company and
looking for another job, he agreed. [laughing] He needs me, and he
cannot afford for me to leave. (9)
Being technically professional can allow individual empowerment (Lehdon-
virta 2016; Lindtner 2014), as it can increase programmers’ bargaining power
in wage or promotion negotiations. Small companies such as AoC tend to
compromise on capable employees’ requests, since it is not always easy to
find the right replacement. In contemporary China, there is a significant mis-
match between market demand and the nurturing of higher education IT
talent, making it hard for small companies to find the right programmer. The
cost of training and maintaining employees cannot be ignored. In this regard,
companies may take technicians’ requests more seriously.
In the daily practices of IT programmers, teamwork is another important
tool to show their empowerment. In IT companies, a team is initially formed
as a project management strategy, but beyond this, teams also constitute
a fundamental social framework for solidarity among programmers. Team
can be of different sizes, usually more than three people, and there is a team
leader who is responsible for coordination, communication, and making
schedules. Through working together, programmers in a team become fa-
miliar with each other; develop shared opinions, and form a sense of be-
longing. Sometimes these relationships can extend from work into their
private life. For example, they may hang out and play computer games to-
gether. Matteo is a Java programmer in a medium-sized IT company, with
his first job specialising in remote router development (yaokong luyouqi
kaifa 遥控路由器开发). As one of the first group of programmers in the com-
pany, he joined the programming group and worked there for three years.
When talking about teams, he shared his experiences with me: 
We formed a very nice team. Our group leader was intelligent and
funny. He taught us from scratch. Everybody learned very fast and
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fought for the same project. We never concealed information or
techniques from one another. We shared everything. We worked to-
gether for three years… But then he [the leader] left the company
because there was a disagreement between him and the boss, my
previous boss, over the product design. We all knew he [the leader]
was right, but the boss rejected his idea and a gap grew between
them… After one month, he resigned, taking almost all of the broth-
ers in the developing group with him. The boss lost his support and
became very angry. (10)
Controlled by corporate management, which rationalises homogenisation
and standardisation, individual programmers’ articulations can become a
resistant force to the controlling assemblage. As Wang Jing (2015) indicated,
technology and community-building are equally indispensable in ICT4D.
During the interview, Matteo characterised the team as a community full
of consciousness, identity, solidarity, and power. Empowered by technique
and skills, programmers in corporations form solid articulations that have
become a force to be reckoned with (Ensmenger 2012). The story ended
with the team leader taking his group to another company, where they were
better paid. In the articulations of Matteo, it becomes evident that both
technology and community-building are integrated into and contribute to
their collective solidarity. Compensating and supporting each other, those
two aspects provide programmers in China with the alternative to gain more
bargaining power. 
On 4 January 2015 the Premier of China, Li Keqiang, visited Chaihuo Mak-
erspace (chaihuo chuang ke kongjian 柴火创客空间) in Shenzhen, (11) where
he expressed his appreciation for the maker community and endorsed the
creative group. This gave China’s nascent makerspace a footing in the state
agenda, and ignited the further deployment of makerspaces in Shenzhen.
In June, when the International Maker Week was held in Shenzhen, the local
government introduced two official documents: the Trial regulations to pro-
mote maker culture development (guanyu cujin chuangke fazhan de ruogan
cuoshi (shixing) 关于促进创客发展的若干措施(试行)) and Three-year action
plans to promote maker culture (2015-2017) (cujin chuangke fazhan san-
nian xingdong jihua 促进创客发展三年行动计划) to further encourage and
support the maker movement in Shenzhen. The two documents state the
intention to open more makerspaces, encourage new maker projects, and
give financial support to maker fairs and other maker activities. It also lists
14 maker communities as key platforms for governmental support, includ-
ing Chaihuo, Huaqiangbei Makerspace Centre (huaqiang bei guoji chuangke
zhongxin 华强北国际创客中心), Seed Studio Makerspace (xidi chuangke 矽
递创客), and Luohu Makerspace (Luohu chuangke kongjian 罗湖创客空间). 
In Chinese, “maker” translates as “chuangke” (创客), a word coined by
combining both “maker” and “hacker.” It refers to a technology-based DIY
(do-it-yourself) culture that is more concerned with physical objects and
the innovation of new devices. Maker culture intersects with hacker culture
and shares similar ideals and ethics such as access, networks, shared learn-
ing, and free and open information flow. The main difference is that maker
culture focuses strongly on learning practical skills and carrying out tech-
nology production (Lendtner 2014; Thomas 2002). According to Wang, the
distinction is important because it is through maker communities that on-
line and offline activities converge, humanity and technology meet, and
“real changes can be measured” (Wang 2015, p. 39).
As makerspaces mushroom in China, the constitution of the movement
takes on a diverse and pluralistic maker scene. More “grassroots makers,”
like blue collar workers, freelancers, grassroots NGOs, and the wider general
public, are joining makerspaces. Maker movements gain momentum when
this kind of cross-connection and collaboration happens. Centred on IT and
technology, makerspaces also provide grassroots programmers with good
opportunities to become involved in the massive innovation movement.
Facilitated by start-up toolkits and how-to guides in makerspaces, incuba-
tors, and accelerators, individual programmers take the first steps in esca-
lating themselves to entrepreneurs or project leaders. Programmers
passionately participate in activities such as start-up weekends, hackathons,
co-working programs, and pitch contests, trying to carve out a path to their
future advancement. 
Willis is a Python software developer. After searching around Beijing,
Shanghai, and Wuhan for a job, he was attracted by the favourable policies
toward micro-enterprise (xiaowei qiye 小微企业) in Shenzhen. He came to
Shenzhen, trying to start his own company. He registered his company at
the Shenzhen Industrial and Commercial Bureau for free, and joined the
makerspace there. He quickly found partners and started a program to man-
ufacture infrared adapters (hongwaixian shipeiqi 红外线适配器). He was full
of excitement when describing their ideas, as well as the somewhat com-
plicated mechanism of the infrared adapter: 
It is a cool idea since everyone is familiar with Bluetooth, and IR
blazer (红外发射器) has been forgotten. But if we can make an in-
frared remote controller that can help people control their TV, air
conditioner, and fridge through their mobile phone, isn’t that such a
cool idea? What we need to do is to make an infrared adapter, and
also develop an App for people’s phones. (…) I like the project. You
can feel the power and motivation inside of you in the project, and
you think you can change the world (…). Our team argues and also
cooperates with each other. It’s an invaluable experience... (12)
Lindtner (2014) implies that Chinese makers see their technology produc-
tion as a kind of individual empowerment. In Willis’s case, programmers not
only utilise their techniques, but also network themselves to hardware, fi-
nally creating their own start-ups. As programmers’ engagement within the
maker movement proliferates, many have moved beyond their original en-
vironment to create their own subjectivity and community solidarity. Pro-
grammers stress notions such as making, sharing, giving, learning, playing,
participating, supporting, and changing. Although makerspaces adhere to
openness, sharing, and access, grassroots programmers do not see them-
selves as isolated from the market and business. Rather, their motivation is
to find a sense of community, to improve networking, and to brainstorm
their ideas. 
The data above indicate that the assemblage of programming in China is
constructed on at least two different lines of articulation. First, it is boosted
by nationwide political discourse and economic logic. In order to re-energise
economic growth and build a creative society, the Central Government has
been making great efforts to bridge the massive labour force with an inno-
vation movement. Second, the assemblage of programming is also com-
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prised of individual programmers whose articulations involve the potential
to create an alternative. Although controlled by biased employment rela-
tions, programmers are empowered by their knowledge of technology, skill,
and cooperative form of work, enabling them to resist the programming as-
semblage that prioritises standardised management while ignoring individ-
ual welfare. By joining makerspaces and co-working spaces, grassroots
programmers break the isolation between the virtual platform and the real
world, and unite with each other. In another sense, the involvement of grass-
roots programmers extends the denotation of makers through collaboration
and social participation, and transcends not only technical and professional
barriers but also social class and division of labour. 
Concluding thoughts
Through examining grassroots programmers’ daily practices in the process
of China’s informatization, this article has mapped the myriad articulations
such as engagement, communication, discourse, and practice that make
and unmake programmers’ programming assemblage. In reference to the
original research questions, programmers, as the main producers of infor-
mation and technology in contemporary China, have been involving them-
selves in the grand narrative of China’s informatization, as well as the
construction of a “Creative Society.” Fieldwork uncovers some “hidden re-
alities” that may be different from what people typically imagine of “work-
ing as a techie.” For example, the relentless pursuit of IT crash-courses at
the grassroots level, and the mixed use of Chinese and English in their coding
practices. These “things [that] do not fit” (Becker 2008) call for critical re-
flections upon an uneven programming assemblage formed by both the na-
tional and global technology production system. 
Technology by nature contains inherent biases. As Innis and Watson
(2008) imply in The Bias of Communication, technology and communica-
tion media can be either space-biased or time-biased to serve the power
centre through imposing dominant cultural standards and political ideology.
As latecomers to the programming world, Chinese code techies are con-
fronting “biased technology.” Chinese programmers must follow the rules
premade by Western countries, including the use of English-dominant cod-
ing frameworks, operating systems, and programming languages. Being in-
sufficient in English and other social resources, programmers in China are
disconnected from decision-making, community engagement, and the ex-
pression of opinions in global IT communities. In this sense, technology de-
marcates the line between the included and the excluded, and places
Chinese programmers at the risk of being marginalised. This bias facilitates
the social hierarchy among Chinese programmers: educational attainment,
proficiency in English, and other necessary forms of social capital are all in-
tegrated into the hierarchy of technology, leaving grassroots programmers
mired in unskilled and repetitive work. 
The data also indicate that technology is a mixed blessing for Chinese
programmers. As a means of survival, it exacerbates the precariousness
and marginalisation of grassroots programmers who are far from the
power centre, but the capability of technology production also offers
grassroots programmers the possibility of remaking their subjectivity and
of social collaboration. It shows that while overwhelmed by a web of po-
litical domination and technical hierarchy, programmers can still carve
out some bargaining and breathing space through the empowerment of
algorithms and codes. By working as a team and joining the globally
prevalent maker movement, programmers form collective solidarity, win
bargaining power, and craft their subjectivity. Revolving around a series
of articulations such as peer production, creative making, and open source,
grassroots programmers are embedding themselves into the state’s policy
of building a “creative country” that maintains “massive entrepreneurship
and innovation” (dazhong chuangye wanzhong baoxin 大众创业，万众创
新), but are also generating articulations that conflict with the overall reg-
ulated programming assemblage. This resistance to the homogenising as-
semblage prepares themselves for alternatives. As Lindtner (2014) and
Wang (2015) have suggested, “forming subjectivity and making the
change from within” can be an alternative analysis framework for a trans-
forming contemporary China. The alternative articulations performed by
grassroots programmers in China, dialectically speaking, are an attempted
sublation of the capital-labour antagonism. In other words, programmers’
technological practices extend beyond a binary perspective – it is not a pre-
dominant resistance versus control, or activism versus subjugation model.
On the contrary, the alternative articulation produced by programmers is a
process of becoming from within. This articulation shows how grassroots
software engineers in China try to overcome the social antagonism between
software capital and software labour.
In this article, articulations of making and unmaking the programming as-
semblage in modern China consist of three themes: migrant workers’ in-
volvement in a programming movement promoted by the political
discourse, the technological gap between China as the periphery and the
West as the centre, and the bottom-up expressions and practices to estab-
lish solidarity and form co-operatives. 
Grassroots’ programmers’ work practices in this article highlight the en-
abling and constraining relations between articulations and assemblage. In
other words, individual programmers’ experience constitutes, while also
changing, the spectacle of informatization and globalisation underway in
China. As Wise (2005) argues, every assemblage is made up of “affects and
effectivity.” This article has sought to explain how the articulations of pro-
grammers produce particular power relations and constructions of com-
munication, practice, and empowerment. A dialectical relation can be found
in the articulations and assemblage of Chinese programming labour. Pro-
grammers’ individual communication, experience, and expression constitute
the IT performance on a corporate, national, and global level. Grassroots
communities, however, also develop counterforces that not only refuse to
be homogenised but also advocate for redevelopment and reconstruction.
This self-contradiction performed by programming labour demonstrates the
alternative narrative of software labourers in China trying to overcome the
labour-capital antagonism. ICT has long been invoked as a site of resistance
that can bring people together and make a change (Qiu 2009; Yang 2009).
The mastery of technique means making a difference, either through cre-
ating the possibility of collaboration or through forming community soli-
darity. As part of the critical forces of social development and change,
programming itself also becomes an alternative discourse that is open, ex-
pressive, and collective. 
Although it would be tempting to argue that the maker movement in
China is a new attempt to make social relations and rebuild “the program
of society,” it is nevertheless also essential to realise that the formation of
maker movements is still at the very beginning of social resistance, and that
the grassroots programmers involved lack structural solidarity. Through the
deployment of technology and the building of makerspaces, a social net-
working community that revolves around IT techies is emerging. In his dis-
cussion of the distinctions of the digital age, Douglas Rushkoff (2002, p. 7)
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writes: “In the highly programmed landscape ahead, you will either create
the software or you will be the software. It is really that simple: Programmed
or be programmed.” It would be incorrect to conclude that the maker move-
ment is the way for social transformation, but it does show the dialectical
possibility and provides the potential. The subversive effect created by tech-
nology and social relations entails continuous imagination.
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